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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTIONMinimum Age Requirement for Candidates for Detroit
Common Council Violates Equal Protection Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment-Manson v. Edwards*
Marc Manson desired to be a candidate for a seat on the Detroit
Common Council, the City's legislative body. He was a citizen of the
United States, a resident of Detroit, and a registered voter. However,
he was just twenty-one years old, and, in accordance with the Detroit
City Charter provision requiring that candidates for Common Council be twenty-five years of age,1 the City Clerk refused to accept Manson's nominating petition and declined to place his name on the
primary ballot.2
Manson brought an action in federal district court to declare unconstitutional the City Charter's age restriction on candidacy. He was
joined in his complaint by three Detroit residents who were eighteen,
twenty-four, and thirty-five years of age, who were registered voters,
and who alleged that they desired to vote for Manson in the Common Council election.8 Manson and his coplaintiffs contended that
the charter provision violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it "den[ied] a citizen who is over 18 years
of age elective office simply because he has not reached the age of 25
years."4 The equal protection challenge was sustained after a significant threshold decision that the law had to be "closely scrutinized for
a compelling governmental interest." 5 This initial decision was virtually dispositive of the case since the defendants had conceded their
inability to justify the provision's age classification scheme under the
"compelling governmental interest" test. 6
This Recent Development will discuss the validity and potential
impact of the court's selection of the compelling interest test to measure the compliance of Detroit's age restriction on candidacy with the
fourteenth amendment. It will also explore the possible state goals
sought to be achieved by requiring a minimum age for candidates
and examine whether these goals can be viewed as "compelling
governmental interests."
" 345 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
I. DETROIT, MICH., CHARTER tit. III, ch. I, § 4 (1963) provides in part: "Any person
elected to the office of councilman shall be a citizen of the United States, at least
twenty-five years of age and a resident of the city for at least three years."
2. 345 F. Supp. at 720-21.
3. 345 F. Supp. at 720.
4. 345 F. Supp. at 721.
5. 345 F. Supp. at 723.
6. 345 F. Supp. at 721.
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Judicial analysis of equal protection questions has evolved two
distinct standards for review of governmental classifications. The
"rational basis" test7 requires that a statutory classification bear
"some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."8 Stated
differently, classifications generally do not constitute constitutional
violations unless they rest on "grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the state's objectives."9 The other standard, the
"compelling interest" test,10 demands a demonstration that the state's
restriction is necessary to promote a "compelling state interest."11
This stricter standard eliminates the presumption of constitutionality
generally afforded statutory classifications and, in effect, shifts the
burden of proof from the plaintiff to the state.12
The compelling interest test is applied in cases where the governmental classification is inherently suspect or where it infringes on a
fundamental right. Classifications that are clearly ''suspect" include
those based on race, 13 alienage, 14 or nationality.15 The classification
in Manson was predicated on age, which, as the court noted, has not
yet been categorized as an inherently suspect criterion for classification.16 However, while the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs'
7. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
8, Weber v. Aetna Cas. 8c Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
9. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970), illustrates the use of this standard. A Maryland regulation placed a 250dollar-per-month limit on grants for aid for dependent children regardless of the size
of the family or its actual need. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation because
the State had a "legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the working poor." 397 U.S.
at 486.
IO. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
11. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 {1969) (emphasis original).
12. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
This discussion of the two-tiered equal protection review may be overly rigid.
Professor Gerald Gunther has argued in a recent article that the Court last term was
breaking away from the two-tiered model to demand in certain cases more than a
rational basis. His proposal is that the Court should retain strict scrutiny of classifications involving fundamental interests or suspect classifications. In other areas, he
would have the Court examine whether the means further the legislative ends. This
test would be relatively narrow since it would only demand that the means substantially further the ends, not that the means be the least restrictive possible. Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I (1972).
13. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
14. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
15. E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
16. 345 F. Supp. at 722 n.l. The court added that it would be unwise to conclude
that age may never be considered a suspect classification. Nevertheless, the possibility
that age will be declared suspect seems remote. The current Court is not inclined to
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fundamental allegation was a denial of candidacy,17 it emphasized
that the age classification scheme interfered with the plaintiffs'
fundamental right to vote for the candidate of their choice.18 As the
Supreme Court had previously stated, "[T]he right of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation ...." 10
This blending of the rights of voters and candidates is common
in cases in which qualification requirements for candidacy are challenged. Typically, the prospective candidate asserts his right to appear on the ballot, and he and his supporters (if they are coplaintiffs)
maintain that the barriers to his candidacy deny his supporters the
right to vote for the candidate of their choice.20 When faced with
such challenges, courts focus their attention on the voters' rights,21 as
did the court in Manson. The Supreme Court has not recognized a
naked fundamental right to run for office,22 but has firmly established
that the right to vote is fundamental and cannot be infringed by a
classification that does not meet the compelling state interest test. 28
extend the ambit of the compelling interest test. See Gunther, supra note 12, at
12-15, 24. Also, an implicit holding that age is not a suspect criterion may have been
contained in the Court's invalidation of a congressional statute lowering the voting
age to 18 in state elections. Oregon v. Mitchell,_ 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
17. 345 F. Supp. at 722.
18. 345 F. Supp. at 722-23.
19. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
20. E.g., Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Mogk v. City of
Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bolanoski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.
Mich. 1971); Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also
Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
21. See cases cited in note 20 supra. But see McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp.
289 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Hayes v. Gill, 52 Hawaii 251, 473 P .2d 872 (1970); Schweitzer v.
Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 164 N.W.2d 35 (1969).
22. One of the first cases decided by the Supreme Court involving candidate rights
was Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944). The complainant claimed a violation of
his fourteenth amendment rights when members of a state board refused to certify
correctly the results of a primary, thus depriving him of the nomination and election
as a representative in the state assembly. The Court in holding no cause of action
under the fourteenth amendment stated: "The right to become a candidate for state
office ••. is a right or privilege of state citizenship, not of national citizenship which
alone is protected by the privileges and immunities clause." 321 U.S. at 7.
Later, in Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970), the Court stated that a person
has "a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the
burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications." However, the Court declined to
consider respondents' argument that the compelling interest test need not be applied
to situations that involve exclusions from office rather than from voting, since the
freeholder requirement there challenged did not meet even the "rational basis" test.
396 U.S. at 362.
Most recently the Court avoided the question in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
142-43 (1972), where it said:
The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office, rather
than voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status
to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. However, the rights of
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation ••••
23. E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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Consequently, it is not surprising that the lower courts base their
decisions upon the established rights of voters rather than resolve the
difficult question of the constitutional status of candidate rights.24
For the proposition that classifications with respect to candidacy
infringe the fundamental right to vote, the court in Manson relied
upon Bullock v. Carter25 and Williams v. Rhodes.26 Bullock questioned the constitutionality of the filing fees required of prospective
candidates in Texas. Under the Texas Election Code, the payment of
a filing fee, which could range as high as 8,900 dollars,27 was an
absolute prerequisite to a candidate's participation in the primary
election. Two prospective candidates who were financially incapable
of paying the requisite fees alleged that the Texas system denied
them their right to candidacy.28 Their action was joined by several
voters who expressed the desire to cast their ballots for the excluded
candidates.29
While recognizing that the "initial and direct impact of filing fees
is felt by aspirants for office,"30 the Court focused its attention on the
voters' contentions since the Texas system, by creating barriers to
candidate access to the primary ballot, tended to limit the field of
candidates from whom voters might choose.31 Once the Court found
an infringement of fundamental voting rights, the State's failure to
establish a compelling state interest32 dictated the Court's holding
that the filing fee system violated the equal protection clause.33
A broad reading of Bullock might suggest that any statutory barrier to candidacy, since it necessarily has some effect on the choice of
voters, can be justified only by a showing of a compelling state in24. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
25. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
26. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
27. 405 U.S. at 138 n.11. Fees for district, county, and precinct offices were assessed
by the county executive committee for the party conducting the primary. The committee apportioned the cost of the primary in its county among the various candidates,
in part on the basis of the importance of the offices for which the candidates were
running. 405 U.S. at 137-38.
28. 405 U.S. at 135-36. A third prospective candidate failed to have his application
notarized and to have it accompanied by a statutory loyalty affidavit, and the Court
did not consider his case since his participation was not necessary. 405 U.S. at 136 n.2.
29. 405 U.S. at 136.
30. 405 U.S. at 142.
31. 405 U.S. at 143.
32. The State advanced three justifications for its filing fee system. The fees were
thought necessary to regulate the number of candidates on the ballot. In addition,
filing fees were allegedly required to protect the "integrity of [the] political process"
from frivolous or fraudulent candidates. Finally, the State argued that the fees were
essential to provide a means for financing primary elections. The Court recognized
these as legitimate state interests, but concluded that there was no showing of
necessity. 405 U.S. at 144-49. See also Note, The Constitutionality qf Candidate Filing
Fees, 70 MrcH. L REv. 558, 578-82 (1972).
33. 405 U.S. at 149.
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terest. However, the Bullock Court explicitly limited the scope of its
decision by stating that "not every limitation or incidental burden
on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of
review," and suggesting that a barrier to candidacy "does not of itself
compel close scrutiny."34 The Court stressed a further factor that led
it to apply strict scrutiny to Texas' filing fee system: "Not only are
voters substantially limited in their choice of candidates, but there is
also the obvious likelihood of this limitation falling more heavily on
the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be
unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system."85 Under
this view, Texas' scheme divided voters into two classes, rich and
poor, and generally gave more power to the rich.36 The Court recognized that "[t]his disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause . . . ." but concluded, "[W]e would
ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their
economic status."37 Therefore, the critical aspect of Bullock was that
the filing fee system might have denied an effective vote to a recognizable group, the poor, by excluding from the ballot candidates who
were too poor to pay the fee. 38
In Williams v. Rhodes the plaintiffs challenged Ohio's law regulating the formation of political parties and their acquisition of places
on the ballot. The law required a new political party seeking a
ballot position in the presidential elections to obtain petitions signed
by the number of voters equal to fifteen per cent of the aggregate
votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election and to file the
petitions early in the election year. 39 In contrast, any party that had
received ten per cent of the votes cast in the prior election automatically retained its ballot position without filing any petitions.40 The
34. 405 U.S. at 143.
35. 405 U.S. at 144.
36. As the Court put it, the scheme "gives to the affluent the power to place on the
ballot their own names or the names of the persons they favor." 405 U.S. at 144.
37. 405 U.S. at 144.
38. However, the Court also said, "This would be a different case if the fees
approximated the cost of processing a candidate's application for a place on the
ballot, a cost resulting from the candidate's decision to enter a primary." 405 U.S. at
148 n.29. But the amount of fee should be irrelevant if it prevents an otherwise
qualified candidate from running for office. See Note, supra note 32, at 583.
39. 393 U.S. at 24-25. In addition, several other very stringent conditions had to be
met. The new party had to elect committeemen for a state central committee and
delegates to a national convention, all persons who had not voted in another party's
primary in the past four years. Also there was a possible condition that the petitions
from 15 per cent of the electorate be signed only by persons who had never voted before.
393 U.S. at 25 n.l.
40. 393 U.S. at 25-26.
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American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party, as new
parties41 that could not comply with the more stringent requirements
imposed on them, joined voters who supported the parties' candidates
in contending that these requirements denied them the equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court stated that the right to vote
is heavily burdened if voters can choose only between the two established parties when others are "clamoring for a place on the ballot."42
After it had strictly scrutinized the challenged statute, the Court
directed that the American Independent Party be placed on the
ballot.43
As in Bullock, the reach of Williams can be limited by the fact
that there was an identifiable group of voters who were harmed by
the state's restrictions on ballot access, namely those who supported
the new minority parties' views. The Court's invocation of the stricter standard may have rested, then, on the fact that the Ohio election
law "treated more harshly a group characterized by its dissident substantive views. "44
A further limitation on the scope of Williams should be noted.
The Ohio election law imposed a burden not only on the right to
vote, but on the right of association as well.415 As the Court observed,
"The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus
denied an equal opportunity to win votes."46 The Court may have
subjected the Ohio law to strict scrutiny because it infringed on both
the right to vote and the right to associate. 47 In contrast, no organized
41. The Socialist Labor Party was an old party that had lost its position on the
ballot as a result of the requirements and had been unable to regain it. 393 U.S. at
27-28.
42. 393 U.S. at 31.
43. Actually, a preliminary 01·der by Justice Stewart, as circuit justice, had placed
the American Independent Party on the ballot. The Court's decision allowed it to
remain on the ballot. The Socialist Labor Party was denied a similar remedy because
of its delay in asking for relief. The Court felt that such relief could not be granted
at the time of its decision without serious disruption of the election process. 393 U.S.
at 34-35.
44. The Supreme Coui·t, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 86, 94-95 (1968).
45. 393 U.S. at 30. After framing the question in mixed terms, the Court con-

cluded its discussion by stating: "But here the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws
taken as a whole imposes a burden on voting and associational rights which we hold
is an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 393 U.S.
at 34. See also Recent Decision, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 892 (1969); Note, supra note
32, at 574-76; Recent Decision, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 202 (1969).
46. 393 U.S. at 31.
47. Another interpretation is that the Court was supplying alternative constitutional
grounds, either of which would have been sufficient to support its holding. The Court
may have been saying that, in the absence of a compelling state interest, the Ohio law
violated the first amendment as applied to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment by abridging the right of the new parties' members to
associate, see 393 U.S. at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring), and that it violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by creating a classification that in-
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political parties were involved in Manson, 48 and the Manson plaintiffs apparently alleged no more than that Detroit's age restrictions
on candidacy infringed their individual voting rights.
Therefore, Manson's application of the "compelling interest" test
to the age restrictions on candidacy probably rests primarily upon the
authority of Bullock. It is clear that age barriers for elective offices
ultimately limit voters in their choice of candidates. Manson's exclusion from the primary ballot effectively prevented his supporters
from voting for their preferred candidate.49 But under the narrower
reading of Bullock and the authority of Jenness v. Fortson 50 such a
burden on voting alone is not necessarily sufficient to trigger application of the compelling interest test. Additionally, there must be some
other factor, perhaps an identifiable group denied its right to a representative candidate by the restriction on candidacy. In Bullock,
there was the "obvious likelihood" that the filing fee requirement
would fall most heavily on the community's less affluent.
Similarly, in Manson, as in any controversy involving candidate
age restrictions, there was perhaps an "obvious likelihood" that the
restriction's primary impact would be felt by those voters whose age
was below the statutory minimum for candidacy. Although some can~
didates who met the age requirements might have represented the
underage group's political views, the age restriction was an absolute
bar to the candidacy of any of the group's own members. 51 However,
while the facts of Manson might thus fall within the ambit of Bulfringed the fundamental right to vote. Under this interpretation, the Court's independent equal protection holding would be stronger precedent for Manson than under
the interpretation advanced in the text.
48. Indeed, Detroit's Common Council elections are nonpartisan.
49. Although it could be argued that the right to vote is not infringed since a
write-in ballot is possible, the issue is the right to cast an effective vote. Even if
Manson had won the election with write-in votes, he would have been prevented from
assuming office because of his age. As the Manson court stated: "It is hardly an effective exercise of the franchise to cast a ballot for a person the government will forbid
from taking office." 345 F. Supp. at 722,
50. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). In Jenness the Court upheld a Georgia law requiring an
independent candidate or political parties that received less than 20 per cent of the
vote in the most recent election to file a petition signed by 5 per cent of the electorate
in order to gain a place on the ballot. Williams was distinguished because the Georgia
requirements in their totality did not create a virtual monopoly for the two established parties, Georgia freely allowed write-ins, recognized independent candidates, did
not have an unreasonably early deadline for filing, and allowed voters to sign petitions
for any number of parties and candidates. In practice, two independent candidates
had won recent elections. The requirements furthered the State's interest in requiring
some showing of significant support without unnecessarily freezing the status quo. 403
U.S. at 434-42.
51. One historian, speaking of our representative government, wrote, "By virtue of
the franchise the people were empowered to choose representatives whose virtues and
abilities were known to them and whose interest was organically related to their own."
Buel, Democracy and the American Revolution: A Frame of Reference, in THE ADVANCE OF DEMOCRACY 48, 62 0, Pole ed. 1967).

March 1973]

Recent Developments

861

lock, the Manson opinion is conspicuously devoid of any concern for
the impact of the candidacy age requirement on any particular group
of voters. One of the plaintiffs who desired to vote for Manson was
thirty-five years old52 and thus clearly outside the class of underage
voters. But the court found the classification burdensome to "Manson
and his supporters" without distinguishing between the younger and
older supporters. 53 From this it may be inferred that the court considered it unnecessary to identify a discrete group on which the candidacy restriction weighed most heavily and that it applied the
compelling interest test to the restriction solely because it infringed
indirectly the rights of individual voters. This reading of Manson
would represent an extension of Bullock, for it could lead to the use
of the compelling interest test whenever voters challenge the constitutionality of any statutory or constitutional restriction that denies
a place on the ballot to their preferred candidate. Such provisions include those limiting an elected official to a maximum number of
terms, 54 prohibiting convicts from running for office,55 placing maximum ages on the holders of elective offices,56 and denying candidacy
to individuals already employed in a public capacity. 57 Indeed, even
such traditional requirements as residency58 and citizenship59 might
be subjected to close scrutiny to determine if they violate the equal
protection clause.
The court in :Manson had no occasion to consider possible justifications for Detroit's age limitation on candidacy because the defendants conceded their inability to supply the compelling interest
that the court demanded. 60 At the outset of an inquiry into possible
justifications it should be noted that the authority to prescribe qualifications for candidates to state public offices is among the powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.61 While the Supreme
Court in Bullock recognized "the breadth of power enjoyed by the
States in determining ... the manner of elections," it stated that
"this power must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."62 Something
52. 345 F. Supp. at 720.
53. 345 F. Supp. at 723.
54-. E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 282.
55. E.g., MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 7.
56. E.g., N.Y. CoNST. art. 6, § 25(b).
57. E.g., MICH. CoNST. art. 4, § 8.
58. E.g., ALA. CoNST. art. 5, § 117.
59. E.g., MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.161 (1967).
60. 345 F. Supp. at 721.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." See also Gaunt v. Brown, 341 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D. Ohio), affd. mem,,
409 U.S. 809 (1972).
62. 405 U.S. at 141.
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beyond the reserved power of the states must be offered in an attempt
to justify age limitations on candidacy under the compelling interest
test.
The basic objective in prescribing an age restriction for public
office is probably to ensure that candidates are qualified, and several
reasons can be advanced for finding a relationship between the age
and the quality of a candidate. 63 One explanation is that an older
person is more "experienced" and more likely to be knowledgeable
about the problems of his constituency.64 However, because one has
had greater "experience" does not mean in all cases that he has
learned from his experience or that he can apply it to governmental
problems. In addition, some younger persons, who are still engaged
in or have just completed the educational process, may be more
acutely aware of the events surrounding them than are many older
citizens.65 Since age is therefore not a precise indicator of a person's
qualifications for public office, some existing age restrictions may not
satisfy the strict equal protection test. Under that test, a classification
designed to deny candidacy to unqualified persons must be drawn
narrowly enough so that only such persons are excluded from the
ballot.66 While age restrictions may possibly exclude the incompetent, they simultaneously may exclude many well-qualified citizens
from the political arena. 67 In addition, they do not ensure that only
the qualified will run, for numerous other factors-such as education,
mental capacity, and physical stamina-indicate the ability of a
candidate. If the state desires to protect its voters from unqualified
candidates, age should not be the only criterion for classification. It
63. Some unappealing arguments are that youthful opinions are "too crude and
erroneous" and that youth lack a responsible attitude:
[E)very man carried with him in his own experience a scale for measuring the
deficiency of young politicians; since he would if interrogated be obliged to
declare that his political opinions at the age of 21 were too crude and erroneous
to merit an influence on public measures.
l THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION oF 1787, at 375 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
(remarks of Colonel Mason, after moving to require a 25-year•age requirement as a
qualification for representatives).
While it is argued that responsibility comes with age, several states, including Michigan, have voiced a vote of confidence in the responsibility of their younger citizens by
lowering the age of majority to 18 years. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 722.51-.55 (Supp.
1972).
64. E.g., THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1835-36, at 305 (H. Dorr
ed. 1940) (remarks of Mr. Moody on the question of adopting a requirement that the
governor be 25 years old): "[The Committee on the Executive] thought it reasonable
to suppose, that whatever might be the talents of a young man, yet his experience, if
he pursued a proper course, would make him more competent, at the age of 25, to
fill the office of Governor."
65. J. DOLAN, REPORT TO THE PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING
PARTICIPATION ON LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, at 8-9 (1964).
66. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
67. Texas in Bullock argued that filing fees served the legitimate purpose of limiting
the ballot to serious candidates. The Court in rejecting this argument noted that
filing fees also excluded legitimate candidates unable to pay the fees. 405 U.S. at
145-46.
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would probably be just as sensible, if not more so, to restrict candidacy to those of a certain intelligence rating, or those with a high
school education, or even those who have had a college economics
course.
Another possible justification for minimum-age requirements is
that they enjoy wide application and general acceptance. The United
States Constitution establishes age qualifications for senators, representatives, and for the President and Vice President. 68 Similar provisions requiring minimum ages for state governors, lieutenant
governors, senators, and representatives exist in most state constitutions. 69 City charters typically specify ages at which the mayor and
councilmen may run for office.70 History and the status quo thus
provide persuasive support for age and other candidate restrictions, 71
but it would be difficult to conclude that such factors rise to the
dignity of compelling governmental interests.72
Given the decision to apply the strict equal protection test, the
Manson court's invalidation of the twenty-five-year-old minimum-age
requirement seems correct. However, common sense dictates that
the state must show a compelling interest in a candidacy age restriction at some point; no one would suggest that a five-year-old child
is capable of handling the duties of a city councilman or state legislator. In an analogous context, the Ninth Circuit stated in United
States v. Duncan: 73
At some point on the age scale, all would agree that those below it
should not be jurors because of immaturity and lack of education.
Opinions may differ as to where the line should be drawn, but not as
to whether it should be drawn at all.74
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3 (a senator must be 30 and a representative must be
25 years old); art. II, § 2 (the President must be 35); amend. XII (the Vice President
must be 35).
69. For example, under the Michigan constitution the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor must be 30, art. 5, § 7, and the state senators and representatives must be
21, art. 4, § 6.
70. E.g., DETROIT, MICH,, CHARTER tit. IV., ch. III, § 2; tit. III, ch. I, § 4 (1963).
71. The Missouri supreme court in State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70,
76 (1972), upheld a residency requirement with this justification: "Durational residency,
citizenship, and age requirements as conditions to holding office, both federal and state,
have been provided throughout the history of the country." But, in a strong dissent
to the majority opinion, Judge Seiler argued that a historical justification is not
persuasive or relevant. He said, "Historically, it used to be that 21 was the age
for voting. Now it is 18. Historically, only men had the right to vote. Now, both men
and women can vote.••• Times are changing." 483 S.W.2d at 77.
72. In fact, the Manson court expressly rejected an attempt to analogize the present
restriction to the age restrictions in the Federal Constitution. 345 F. Supp. at 724 n.2.
Furthermore, by the criterion of "one person, one vote" the United States Senate is
malapportioned. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court imposed that standard on both
houses of state legislatures. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553 (1964).
73. 456 F.2d 1401 (1972).
74. 456 F.2d at 1405.
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The question of the point at which age should become a criterion for
granting responsibility has been argued in many areas,715 most notably
in debates concerning the minimum voting age. The Supreme Court
upheld the congressionally approved minimum age for federal elections at eighteen years,76 and this standard was subsequently adopted
as the national voting age in the twenty-sixth amendment. Given
the intimate relation between the validity of candidacy restrictions
and the rights of voters, this standard is a logical and convenient
stopping point.77 Thus, Manson should not be read to suggest that
an eighteen-year-old minimum-age requirement is constitutionally
invalid. 78 Even a narrow reading of Manson, however, could have a
profound effect on age requirements for elective offices. For example,
Manson's interpretation of the compelling interest test could be applied to invalidate age requirements for the offices of mayor, county
commissioner, state legislator, and even governor.
The Manson opinion thus foreshadows the wholesale invalidation
of existing age restrictions on candidacy. Its conclusions represent
an extension of existing law. Yet, when viewed within the context of
our democratic, representative form _of government, the decision may
not appear so aberrational. The court's elimination of statutory
prohibitions against an eighteen-year old seeking a seat on the Detroit
Common Council means not that age is irrelevant to qualifications
but only that the weighing of a candidate's age as a factor in assessing his qualifications is reserved ultimately and exclusively to
the_ voters, along with all of the other factors that they inevitably
consider in casting their ballots. It may be assumed that a young
candidate's knowledge and experience will be questioned by opponents, and he will have the burden to prove to the electorate that
his youth
not adversely affect his capacity to represent them
adequately.79
The fundamental question raised by a case like Manson may be

·will

75. For example, the minimum drinking age, the minimum driving age, and the age
of majority have probably been considered in all state legislatures.
76. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
77. Cf. Oregon
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 294 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting):
Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest"
standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point
rather than another.
78. The issue in Manson was apparently limited to whether one who is 18 years
old can be denied a place on the ballot solely because he is under 25. See 345 F. Supp.
at 721.
79. As the court in Mogk v. City of Detroit, !l!l5 F. Supp. 698, 701 (E.D. Mich.
1971), stated:
It is a matter· of common knowledge that those who seek public office go to
considerable effort and expense to secure exposure, and it may be safely assumed
that o.eponents in an election race will seek out and make known the shortcomings
of their opposition and assert their own superior qualifications for a particular
post.
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not whether age restrictions are sufficiently related to the state goal
of ensuring that only qualified candidates run for office, but rather
whether the government's imposition on the electorate of its definition of "qualified" is proper in a democracy. The state's assertion
that its criteria for candidacy advance some compelling state interest
may represent nothing more than a paternalistic distrust of voter
judgment.80 Perhaps, then, Manson's underlying message is that
the electoral process can and indeed should be the best safeguard
against unqualified individuals assuming elective office. The voting
citizenry, not the state, should be the ultimate judge of the competency or incompetency of those who desire to represent them in
public office.
80. Of course, this argument taken to an extreme would render illegitimate any
attempt by a state to draw an age-based restriction. Under this logic the voters are
capable of judging for themselves whether, for example, a five-year old is qualified.
However, it is unlikely that a court would declare that the state's interest in protecting
its electoral system is not compelling. Common sense would seem to indicate that a
state could draw lines to prevent such obviously frivolous candidacies. As suggested
above, 18, the voting age, is a likely stopping point. With this line, all the electorate
can vote for candidates of their age group.

